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Recent Decisions
CoNSTrTUTIONAL LAW- NoNcoNFORMING USES - VESTED RIGHT
In 1922, the city of Akron enacted a comprehensive zoning or-
dinance, which inter alia placed within a residential zone property
on which defendant had since 1916 continuously operated a junk
yard. The ordinance provided that existing nonconforming uses
could remain until the city council had in its discretion determined
that such uses had been permitted to exist for a reasonable time. In
January, 1950, Council determined that as of January 1, 1951,
defendant's nonconforming use was to be discontinued because
it would then have existed for a reasonable time. The defendant
having continued the use beyond said date, the city brought an
injunctive action. The trial court denied relief but the court
of appeals reversed and entered judgment for the city. On further
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, held, reversed. The right to
continue to use one's property in a lawful business, if not a nuis-
ance and not unlawful when the business was established, is
within the protection of Section 1, Amendment XIV, U.S. Con-
stitution and Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution. City of
Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E. 2d 697 (1953).
The principle that comprehensive zoning laws have a pros-
pective aspect has been recognized as a proper exercise of the
police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Youngstown
v. Kahn, 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925). The principle is
subject in the individual case to the requirement that the power
be exercised reasonably and bear a rational relation to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. Nectow v. Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928). Whether such provisions can by retroactive
effect operate against uses in existence when the ordinance was
passed is a question which is in great conflict in the states, and
which the Supreme Court of the United States on two occasions
has declined to answer. Louisiana ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
McDonald, 280 U.S. 556 (cert. denied, 1929). Marblehead Land
Co. v. Los Angeles, 284 U.S. 634 (cert. denied, 1931).
Two decisions, illustrating one state's view, sustained the val-
idity of a New Orleans zoning ordinance which required noncon-
forming uses to terminate in one year; however, they did not
completely repudiate the nuisance theory of an earlier case. State
ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So.
615 (1929).
The more accepted view and probably the majority rule is
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that an existing use creates an individual property right and
that a government cannot take such property by exercising its
police power. Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14
(1932). L O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P. 2d
401, 9 A.L.R. 2d 1031 (1949), the court held that a change of
ownership did not affect the new owner's right to continue an
existing nonconforming business. The principal case places Ohio
with the majority as to the protection given an existing non-
conforming use. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that such a
use creates a vested property right constitutionally protected.
This decision makes decisive an earlier appellate decision which
held that a zoning law cannot operate retrospectively to prevent
an owner from exercising his full rights in the use of his property.
Reilly v. Conti, 93 Ohio App. 188, 112 N.E. 2d 558 (1952), Appeal
dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 232, 108 N.E. 2d 281 (1952).
All courts have recognized that when the existing use comes
within the category of a common law nuisance it may be elimi-
nated. Manos v. Seattle, 173 Wash. 662, 667, 24 P. 2d 91, 92 (1937);
Jones v. Los Angeles, supra. Uses which will be deemed a nuisance
will vary, but cases indicate that a more liberal attitude exists than
at common law. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
Also, the liberalized concept of public use makes eminent domain
a feasible way to eliminate nonconforming uses in cases not within
the nuisance category and where the rule of the Jones case is
followed. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.
2d 772 (1953).
The Jones rule has been indirectly limited by finding that
the use in question was not an existing use. The minority rule
that a valid permit constitutes an existing use finds expression in
Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923). The majority
view requires a valid permit and substanntial construction or
liabilities in reliance on the permit. Brett v. Bldg. Comm'r. of Brook-
line, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924). Where the use has existed
in violation of a valid zoning law or contra to a restrictive conven-
ant in a deed no rights are created to justify continuance. Wilkins
v. San Bernardino, 162 P. 2d 711 (Cal. 1945); Affd. 29 Cal. 2d
332, 175 P. 2d 542 (1946). Larson v. Howland, 279 App. Div. 650,
108 N.Y.S. 2d 231 (1951).
The Ohio courts which have considered what constitutes a
vested right indicate that a valid permit plus substantial construc-
tion in reliance on the permit create such a right. Williams v.
Deer Park, 78 Ohio App. 231, 47 Ohio Op. 11 (1946). Behm v.
Wolfert, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 647 (1924) motion to certify dismissed,
111 Ohio St. 830 (1924). Santangelo v. City of Cincinnnati, 25
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 49 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnnati, 1924). This rule
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is consistent with the majority rule of substantial construction
expressed in Brett v. Bldg. Comm'r., supra. The Ohio courts
have consistently held that the issuance of a valid permit does
not create a vested property right and that the permit may be
revoked without violating any constitutionally protected rights.
Reilly v. Conti, supra; Williams v. Guion, 27 Ohio App. 141, 5 Ohio
L. Abs. 696 (1927); See State v. Rendigs, 98 Ohio St. 251, 120 N.E.
836 (1918). However, where a subsequently enacted zoning law
has excepted the holders of validly issued building permits from
the requirements of the law, it has been held that the nonconform-
ing construction must be allowed. Hauser v. State, 113 Ohio St.
662, 150 N.E. 42 (1925); State ex rel. Balce v. Hauser, 111 Ohio St.
402, 145 N.E. 851 (1924); See, State v. Kreuzweiser, 120 Ohio St.
352, 166 N.E. 228 (1929). Of course, where the contemplated use
will be a nuisance, a permit issued prior to the enactment of an
ordinance prohibiting such use may be revoked even though there
has been substantial reliance and thus expense incurred and some
construction begun. State v. Rendigs, 98 Ohio St. 25, 120 N.E. 836
(1918). This holding is consistent with the general view that a
use which is a nuisance may be prohibited at any time.
The Jones rule has been further restricted by limiting expan-
sion and alteration so as ultimately to eliminate the nonconform-
ing use. BASSETT, ZoN-I 109 (1940). This question is largely
one of statutory interpretation and the case law is in great con-
flict; thus the rules of the particular jurisdiction must be examined.
The cases would indicate that two theories are followed. The first
is that the use may be restricted to the area of original lot but
must be allowed to expand naturally therein. See, In re Gilfillan's
Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 Atl. 136 (1927). The other theory strictly
confines the use to exact use existing when the ordinance was
enacted. See, Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E. 2d 235
(1947). Extra limitation raises questions as to constitutionality.
YOKELY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE, §§153 to 157, inclusive (2d ed.
1953).
Once the vested right has been established, Ohio allows much
limitation on subsequent uses, changes, alterations, and extensions
in that use. In State v. Stenger, 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N.E. 226
(1929), an ordinance providing that a nonconforming use in a
residential district could either be extended or substituted with
another business, but not both, was held a valid exercise of the
police power. The extent to which the existing use of the property
was limited in the Stenger case certainly approaches the limitation
which Akron attempted to impose in the principal case. Neverthe-
less, provided there -is a reasonable relation to the public welfare,
strict limitation upon subsequent additions or uses has been held
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valid. Gwyn v. Trimedge, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 307, 109 N.E. 2d 1
(1952). Where a change to a use of. a higher classification was
made, it was held that such change was within the purview of an
ordinance which allowed existing nonconforming use to continue.
Mahoning Express Co. v. Youngstown, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 745 (1933).
A significant inroad has been made on the rule of the Jones
and O'Connor cases, supra, by a recent New York decision. De-
fendant had kept pigeons on his property prior to an ordinance
prohibiting such use, but the court ordered that use discontinued
holding that a nonconforming use must be allowed to continue
only if termination causes financial loss to the property owner
by rendering valueless his improvements or his business. The
court recognized the general rule that an existing nonconforming
use is constitutionally protected. People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 165,
106 N.E. 2d 34 (1952).
Judicial reaction to magnitude of the taking as a factor af-
fecting constitutionality suggests as a possible solution to the non-
conforming use problem, the amortization principle, under which
the owner is given a specific period of time, related to the nature of
the use and the type of construction, within which the nonconform-
ing use must be eliminated. See notes, 9 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 477
(1942); 35 VA. L. REv. 348 (1949). Many cities have adopted
such provisions; however, there is very little judicial opinion as
to the principle's constitutionality. A Tallahassee, Florida ordi-
nance giving an owner ten years to terminate the use of a non-
conforming filling station was recently upheld in the Fifth Circuit
Court as a reasonable exercise of the police power. Standard Oil
Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F. 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950). Writers also
indicate that the two Dema Realty cases from the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, supra, stand for the proposition that amortization
is a proper method to eliminate nonconforming uses; however the
time limit of one year seems harsh and the reasoning in those
cases was confused by the court's views on. nuisance law and
zoning.
No Ohio court has construed an ordinance using the amortiza-
tion principle as a means of eventually terminating an existing
nonconforming use. However, the Akron ordinance in the princi-
pal case providing for discontinuance after a reasonable period of
use is similar in purpose and effect. But because of the discretion
vested in the council as to precisely when the use will end and
thus the possibility of arbitary application, the principle of the
Akron ordinance and strict amortization may be distinguished.
It is hoped that the supreme court has not foreclosed the question
of the constitutionality of the amortization principle. Ordinances
incorporating amortization are the only feasible way to eliminate
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nonconforming uses and thus accomplish the purpose of compre-
hensive zoning, namely, uniformity of use.
Donald W. Wiper, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - REFUSAL To TAKE JURISDICTION ON A
WRIT OF LNDAMus
This was an original action in mandamus instituted by relator
in the supreme court against the Industrial Commission and three
of its members. The prayer of the petition was "that a . . . writ
of mandamus issue commanding the respondents to vacate and
set aside their order..." which was adverse to the relator. Re-
spondent demurred, raising the question of whether relator was
entitled to an issuance of the writ by the supreme court., Held:
Writ denied. State ex rel. Allied Wheel Products, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission, 161 Ohio St. 555, 120 N.E. 2d 421 (1954).
The Ohio Constitution provides that the supreme court shall
have "original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas
corpus, prohibition and precedendo," and that, "No law shall be
passed or rule made whereby any person shall be prevented from
invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court." Orno
CONST., ART. IV, SEC 2.
In general it is said that mandamus is an extraordinary writ
and will not issue unless there is a clear legal right and an absence
of any other adequate remedy. State ex rel. Roth v. West, Dir. of
Finance, 130 Ohio St. 119, 197 N.E. 115 (1935). Pursuant to the
above rule the court has refused to issue the writ, for example,
where the relator had an administrative appeal which had not
been exhausted, State ex rel. Stein v. Sohngen, 147 Ohio St. 359,
71 N.E. 2d 483 (1947), or an appeal to common pleas court which
had not been used. State ex rel. Campbell v. Bryant, Director of
Liquor Control, 158 Ohio St. 495, 110 N.E. 2d 137 (1953). The
issuance of the writ of mandamus rests within the sound discretion
of the court which is asked to issue it. State ex rel. Roth v. West,
supra. The discretion exercised in these cases is substantive dis-
cretion, i.e. after the court has allowed the mandamus proceeding
and the parties have presented their evidence, the writ is granted
or denied depending upon the absence or presence of another
adequate remedy.
In the present case, however, the court refused to allow a
mandamus proceeding and denied its jurisdiction without passing
on the merits of the relator's claim for mandamus. The court
reasoned that, "Since both the common pleas court and the court
of appeals have the power and authority to issue such a writ this
court, in the exercise of its discretion, should use some discrimina-
tion in determining whether the controversy involved in an original
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action for mandamus in this court is such as to justify bringing
the cause immediately to the supreme court instead of presenting
it in the first instance to the common pleas court or perhaps the
court of appeals." (Emphasis supplied) In so holding, the court
exercised procedural discretion, i.e. the court disallowed the man-
damus proceeding, declaring that ordinarily the proceeding itself
will be denied where the relator has another adequate jurisdiction
and the right involved is a private one. This discretion is usually
governed by constitution, statute or court rules. ILLINoIs SUPREME
COURT RULE 46; VERNON'S TEXAs RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE, RULE
474; OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT RULE 27; NEw Mmxco SUPREME
COURT RULE 24 or NEw MExIco CoNsT. ART-4, SEC. 4; NORTH
DAKOTA REV. CODE OF 1943, §27-0204.
As precedent for relegating relator to either the common pleas
court or the court of appeals, the court cited State ex rel. Werden
v. Williams, 26 Ohio St. 170 (1870). In the Werden case it appears
the supreme court denied its original jurisdiction of mandamus,
saying that "... where circumstances do not justify the taking of
the case out of its order for hearing, it can more speedily and
conveniently be heard in the District Court." The court in the
Werden case further stated that this was the rule of practice adopt-
ed by the court in regard to writs of error and writs of habeas
corpus citing Benham v. Conklin, 3 Ohio St. 509 (1853), and Ex
parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81 (1857).
In Benham v. Conklin, supra, the supreme court refused leave
to file a petition in error to reverse judgment of the common pleas
court because relief could be had in the intermediate district court
without leave, and there was no special reason why it should be
granted. By refusing leave to petition, the court was exercising
procedural discretion; and in so doing conformed to Ohio Const.
Art. IV, Sec. 2 (1851) and 51 Omo LAws. 57, sec. 514. In Ex parte
Shaw, supra, the relator, a prisoner in the Ohio Penitentiary,
applied to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus. Basis for
the writ was the assertion that the sentence of a lower court was
erroneous. The court held that writ of error and not habeas corpus
was the proper remedy, pointing out that habeas corpus could not
be used as a short cut for appeal. It should be noted that the court
in this case allowed its jurisdiction to be invoked but denied the
writ in the exercise of substantive discretion, after the evidence
was presented.
It is difficult to see how these two cases support the holding
in the Werden case, where the court refused to allow its original
jurisdiction to be invoked. The Werden case gives very few facts
and it is difficult to determine exactly what was sought in the peti-
tion, beyond the fact that there was a request for mandamus. A
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reasonable view, however, is that the relator in that case asked
that a petition in mandamus be heard in advance of its order on
the supreme court docket in accordance with Ohio Supreme Court
Rule 2, 14 Ohio St. (v) sec. 4 (1862) which provided that "Causes
will be taken up for, decision in their order on the docket, and
not otherwise, except that on motion duly filed, and for special
reason, a case may be taken out of its order, and assigned for
hearing or decision at a particular time." The reference in the
Werden opinion to -justification for taking a case out of its order
of hearing, it is-submitted, adds credence to this theory.
Be that as it may, Werden v. Williams, apparently became a
precedent for the court's exercise of procedural discretion in de-
termining whether to entertain suits for writs of mandamus. This
discretion was practiced by requiring parties to obtain leave to
file a petition for the writ. State ex rel. The City of Toledo v.
Lynch, 87 Ohio St. -444, 101 N.E. 352 (1913). The records of the
debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1912 seem to indicate
that this practice of the supreme court was the chief cause for the
amendment to the constitution which was adopted following that
convention to the effect that "No law shall be passed or rule made
whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking the original
jurisdiction of the supreme court." Oio CONST, ART IV, SEc. 2.
In support of the above amendment Mr. Mauk, delegate from
Gallia County, said: "The Supreme Court for a number of years
has required everyone seeking to invoke the jurisdiction to first
get the consent of the court to file his appeal. The result has been
in quo warranto and mandamus and other cases in which the
original jurisdiction has been invoked, the court has required
suitors to go to the circuit court. . . . We have taken from the
supreme court one-half or .more of all its jurisdiction when we
have secured the ratification of the Peck proposal, and that being
so there is no longer any reason why the supreme court cannot
exercise the jurisdiction- conferred on it -by this amendment to
the constitution." OH1O CONSTITUTIONAL CONVrNTIO, PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES, Vol. 2, p. 1831. (1912).
From this it would appear that the purpose of the amendment
was to end the procedural 'discretion then being exercised by the
supreme court. This purpose was given court sanction when
the -supreme court held invalid its old requirement of leave to file
petitions in original actions in the supreme court. State ex rel.
City of Toledo v. Lynch, 87 Ohio St. 444, 101 N.E. 352 (1913).
The court in the Lynch case said that it was "a practice (emphasis
supplied) long since established and consistently adhered to in this
court to require leave to file petitions invoking the exercise of
its original jurisdiction.. The court-went on to say that the require-
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ment "Has not been made pursuant to any statute or to any formal
rule published in the book of rules." In speaking of the 1912
amendment to Art. IV, sec. 2, the court said, "The language of the
provision will not permit the court either to adopt or adhere to
a rule which requires permission to invoke the exercise of its juris-
diction." (emphasis supplied) State ex rel City of Toledo v. Lynch,
supra. The court in the principal case disposes of the argument
for application of the amendment by saying that "This court
therefore cannot and will not adopt any rule preventing anyone
from invoking its original jurisdiction in mandamus." In this re-
spect, it is significant to note that the denial of its jurisdiction by
the supreme court prior to the 1912 amendment was not pursuant
to any statute or formal rule.
The actual effect of the decision in the principal case would
appear to be a resumption on the part of the supreme court of the
exercise of procedural discretion by making a preliminary finding
as to the nature of the right to be redressed before allowing its
jurisdiction to be invoked, thus affording itself two opportunities
for discretionary action, i.e. procedural discretion before its juris-
diction is invoked and substantive discretion after the evidence
has been produced, provided it decides in the first instance to hear
the case. It is perhaps true, as pointed out by the court in its
opinion, that the original jurisdiction granted to the supreme
court places an excess burden upon the court whose principal
jurisdiction is appellate; and perhaps, as urged in an article on
this subject, our system of extraordinary writs is antiquated and
should be replaced by simpler methods of procedure. The Original
Jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme Court, 7 OHmo ST. L. J. 27 (1940).
However, it is the writer's belief that any revision of original juris-
diction of the supreme court could be more effectively accomplish-
ed and the rights of litigants more specifically defined by means
of a constitutional amendment than by court decision.
Bernard V. Fultz
CRImAL LAw -SEARCH AND SEIZURE -
LInTATiox UNDER EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Defendant, president and manager of an incorporated social
club, was convicted for the unlawful possessiosi of slot machines.
A motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the slot
machines had been seized in violation of rights guaranteed by both
the state constitution (S.H.A. CONST. ART. 2, SEC. 6, 10) and the
Fourth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution was denied by the
trial court. On appeal, held, affirmed. Defendant, as a shareholder
or an employee, did not have sufficient interest in the slot ma-
chines, which were the property of-the corporation, to cause their
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exclusion as evidence. People 'v. Perry, 1 Ill. 2d 482, 116 N.E. 2d
360 (1953).
At common law it was held that the admissability of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of the means through which the
evidence was obtained. 1 GRElsmEAF, EVIDENCE § 254a (12th ed.
1896); 5 JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 2075 n.3 and 2076 n.6 (2d ed. 1926);
8 WIGMORE, EvIDECE- § 2183 (3rd ed. 1940); Fraenkel, Recent De-
velopments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 13 MINn. L. REv. 1
(1928). Although the common law rule was followed by the Su-
preme Court as late as 1904, Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585
(1904), the embryonic federal "exclusionary rule" had been con-
ceived much earlier in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
After the temporary respite of the Adams case the rule was born
in 1914 and has flourished in our federal courts ever since. Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For a more detailed treat-
ment of the rule and its subsequent modifications there is an
abundance of excellent legal commentaries. For history, see, Cor-
nelius, SEARCH Aim SEIzuRE, § 8 (8) (2d ed. 1930); 8 WiGmons,
EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3rd ed. 1940); LAssoN, THE HISTORY A DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AmENDMENT TO THE UNrED STATES CON-
STrrUTION (1937). For more recent developments, see Mezansky,
The Battle of the Fourth Amendment, 20 PENN. BAR ASSN. QUART.
231 (1948-49); Magill, Towards a More Liberal Connstruction, of
the Fourth Amendment, 27 DICTA 13 (1950); note, 38 J. Cmm. L.
244 (1948-49). Illinois adopted the Weeks doctrine in 1924, People
v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924) and reaffirms its al-
legiance in the instant case.
Those who adhere to the rule usually argue that if evidence
which is the result of an illegal search is admitted, the Fourth
Amendment will be nullified, Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (Cal.
D., 1947); 8 A.B.A.J. 646 (1922); Glenn, Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Search and Seizure, 22 Ky. L. J. 63 (1933-4) and that if il-
legally seized evidence were allowed to be used against the one
from whom it was seized he would, in effect, be compelled to give
evidence against himself thereby violating his rights under the
Fifth Amendment. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Cornelius, SEARcH A SsazuRE, § 2 (2) (2d. ed. 1930) ; but see infra.
The rule has been the subject of vituperation by commentators, at
least one of whom has achieved no little stature in the field of
evidence. See 8 WIGMOPE, EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3rd ed. 1940); Com-
ment, 31 YALE L.J. 518 (1921-22); 8 ComqELL L.Q. 76 (1922-23).
The usual contention is that the courts, in applying the rule, have
illogically confused the Fourth and Fifth Amendments binding
the two together in a manner that was not in the minds of the
framers. However, there is. reason to believe that the Supreme
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Court in deciding that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are
intimately connected, Boyd v. United States, 96 U.S. 727 (1877)
had ample historical precedent dating back to 1765. Entick v.
Carrington, State Trials, XIX, 1029 (1765); Lasson, THE HISToRY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoURTH u AENDM TO THE UNM
STATES CONSTITUTION 109. Other commentators suggest that the
Fourth Amendment stands alone, pointing out the inconsistency
that permits a corporation to raise the exclusionary rule, Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) yet denies
them the protection of the self incrimination privilege of the Fifth
Amendment. Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913). This
inconsistency combined with similar incongruous decisions in
cases involving confessions and deportations leads them to con-
clude the exclusionary rule is a result of judicial expansion of
the Fourth Amendment or a "McNabb type" rule. Grant, Consti-
tutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized
Evidence, 15 So. CALIF. L. REV. 60 (1941); Comment 14 Omo ST.
L. J. 214 (1953). Other writers see the opinion in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) as a disposition on the part of the court to
free the exclusionary rule from any reliance on the Fifth Amend-
ment. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and
Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950). Those who would chal-
lenge the rule also extend the theory that a liberal application
hamstrings law enforcement and coddles wrongdoers. Waite, Pub-
lic Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MicH. L. REv. 749 (1933).
The rule is not without conditions, as can be evidenced from
the plight of the defendant in the instant case. The courts say that
a person seeking to invoke the privilege under the rule must have
an interest in the property seized. Lewis v. United States, 92 F. 2d
952 (10th Cir. 1937). This is necessary since it is a constitutional
privilege and therefore available only to the one whose rights have
been infringed. United States v. DeVasto, 52 F. 2d 26 (2d Cir.
1931). The court in the instant case follows precedent in holding
that the defendant neither as an officer of a corporation, Lagow
v. United States, 159 F. 2d 843 (2d Cir. 1946) nor as an employee
of the corporation, United States v. Mandel, 17 F. 2d 270 (D. Mass.
1927); Kelley v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932) or
more precisely as a member of an incorporated fraternal order,
United States v. Wainer, 49 F. 2d 789 (W.D. Pa. 1931) can raise
the privilege. Another condition on the rule is that one seeking its
protection must first make a motion to suppress the evidence. 1
WHARTON, CRmMNAL EVIDENCE, § 376 (11th ed. 1935). The Illinois
courts require the defendant to claim ownership of the property
and request its return. People v. Edge, 406 Il. 490, 34 N.E. 2d 359
(1941). In the instant case the court points out that, even though
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the defendant might have held an interest as a club member, he
did not request the return of the slot machines which would raise
the issue of the legal sufficency of his motion. A third requisite
of the rule as applied in federal courts is that only evidence ob-
tained by federal officers will be barred and not that obtained
by state officers or private persons. Burdeau v. McDonald, 256
U.S. 465 (1926). However, when a federal officer participated in
a search with state officers the evidence was then excluded. Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
These conditions on the rule are apparently a manifestation
of the doctrinal motion on behalf of the courts that the rule re-
sembles relief awarded to a defendant in the form of a tort counter-
claim against the prosecution against illegal search or, in short,
a remedy. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). Yet
if this be true the defendant cannot be said to be protected from
the search since the remedy is not available until after the illegal
act has taken place. Furthermore, if the rule is to be treated as a
remedy it is inconsistent, since if the victim is not prosecuted no
remedy is available, or if he is prosecuted and found innocent the
remedy is worthless. See comment, 58 YAtx L. J. 144 (1948). But
if the purpose of the rule is not remedial, but serves as a deter-
rent to illegal search, then the exceptions are unnecessary since
the rule no longer becomes a personal remedy.
The problem raised in the instant case, of who has sufficient
interest to raise the privilege, is of purely academic interest in Ohio
since the Ohio courts follow the orthodox or common law rule that
evidence obtained by illegal search is not rendered inadmissible.
State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E. 2d 490 (1936).
It would seem then that defendants in cases such as the prin-
cipal case, are placed in the anomalous position of having enough
interest in the property seized to warrant conviction, but not
enough to allow the protection of the exclusionary rule. A similar
circumstance is found in the law of larceny with respect to the
possession of stolen goods. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 1070
(11th ed. 1935). The illogic of limiting the protection of the rule
to corporations itself is evident since only the shareholders, of-
ficers, employees or members can be said to have suffered an undue
invasion of privacy. Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948). However,
as long as the right of privacy remains a fundamental right it
would seem that the exclusionary rule is superior to other sug-
gested remedies, although one cannot help thinking that it might
draw closer to achieving its purpose if the courts would declare
a shareholder the possessor of enough of a proprietory interest to
raise the privilege. The Supreme Court has given a hint that they
feel the rule should be extended to all the states, but they feel
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bound by the decision in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, 347 U. S. 128 (1954). In any event most Illinois defendants
have been infinitely more successful than the defendant in the
principal case. One study shows that during the year 1950, ninety-
nine and seven-tenths percent of all the motions to suppress were
granted in the Chicago Municipal Court in gambling cases. Another
study indicates seventy percent of all gmnbling cases brought be-
fore the same court are dismissed on a motion to suppress the
evidence because of illegal search and seizure. Dash, Cracks in the
Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 I... L. REv. 385 (1951-52).
Charles D. Hering, Jr.
LEGAL PROFESSION - DIsBARMNT FOR CoNTEMPT
IN DEFENDING COm ImsTs
At the conclusion of the long trial of the eleven Communists
for violation of the Smith Act, Judge Harold Medina summarily
convicted the six defense attorneys for contempt of court. On the
basis of this action, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York and the New York County Lawyers' Association instituted
disbarment proceedings in the district court against Harry Sacher,
one of these attorneys. Judge Hincke held that, although the rec-
ord contained no indication of moral turpitude, Sacher should be
disbarred for having showed "such excess of zeal in representing
his clients that it obscured his recognition of responsibility as an
officer of the court" [quoted, In re Sacher, 206 F. 2d 358, 359 (2d
Cir. 1953)]. Subsequently the United States Supreme Court, in a
divided opinion, affirmed Judge Medina's judgment of contempt.
The opinion was limited to the issues of the propriety of a summary
conviction and the right of Sacher to a jury trial. U. S. v. Sacher,
343 U.S. 1 (1953). Thereafter, Sacher appealed his disbarment. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, Judge Clark dissenting. Sacher v. Bar
etc. of N.Y., 206 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1953). On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed and cause remanded. The
Court, Justice Reed dissenting, was of the opinion that permanent
disbarment was unnecessarily severe. Sacher v. Bar etc. of N.Y.,
347 U.S. 388 (1954).
Early cases limited disbarment to statutory grounds. In re
Collins, 147 Cal. 8, 81 Pac. 220 (1905); In re Eaton, 4 N.D. 514, 62
N.W. 597 (1895). But now statutory grounds are not regarded as
exclusive. In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926); Wood v.
State ex rel Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932); In re
Zirinsky, 234 App. Div. 464, 255 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1932). As Chief
Justice Taney once said, in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9 (1856),
"It is difficult if not impossible, to enumerate and define, with
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legal precision, every offense for which an attorney or counsellor
ought to be removed."
In considering this subject it is necessary to remember that
disbarment is not a punishment, even though in the principal case
the Supreme Court describes the judgment as "unnecessarily
severe." It is an action of the bar to protect itself and the public.
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116
N.E. 782 (1917); Ex parte Brounsa l, 2 Cowp. 829 (1778); In re
Conner, 357 Mo. 270, 207 S.W. 2d 492 (1948); In re Beakley, 6 Wash.
2d 410, 107 P. 2d 1097 (1940). The courts continually remind us
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution,
and only when the attorney is utterly unfit to be an officer of the
court. In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 267 S.W. 922 (1924).
By taking a narrow view of the few cases in this area the dis-
trict court's decision of disbarment can be supported, but careful
analysis reveals that in most examples of disbarment after con-
tempt, the contempt in question was one of a different character
from the "excessive zeal" apparent here. In re Elam, 357 Mo. 922,
211 S.W. 2d 710 (1948) (Disbarment for attitude and conduct
flagrantly disrespectful to trial court involving also personal at-
tacks on opposing counsel and conflicting interests); In re Riche-
son, 64 Ariz. 85, 166 P. 2d 583 (1946) (Disbarment for groundless
and malicious charges against judges; the "wild, imaginery bases
relied upon indicate his mental instability, and lack of moral
values"); In re Hanson, 93 Wash. 392, 160 Pac. 1141 (1916) (At-
torney's petition for rehearing showed utter disrespect and plain-
est intention to express contempt. The attorney persisted and was
suspended till further order of the court.); People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Association v. Standidge, 333 IlM. 361, 164 N.E. 844 (1928) (At-
torney falsely charged appellate judges with willfully and corrupt-
ly making false findings and was suspended for six months); In re
Graves, 64 Cal. App. 330, 221 Pac. 411 (1923) (libel of judge con-
cerning official acts by attorney); United States ex rel. Hallet v.
Green, 85 Fed. 857 (Cir. Ct. Colo. 1898); Matter of Humphrey,
174 Cal. 290, 163 Pac. 60 (1923).
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Hanson, 316 Ill 502,
147 N.E. 431 (1925) and In re Damron, 131 W. Va. 66, 45 S.E. 2d
741 (1947) emphasize the exaggerated conduct needed to amount
to grounds for disbarment. In the former case, the court said that
to disbar, proof of misconduct and fraudulent and dishonest mo-
tives accompanying it must be clear, and in the latter said that an
attorney may not be disbarred for contempt of court unless his
act or course of conduct amounts to base and aggravated contempt.
See In re Doe 95 F. 2d 386 (2d Cir. 1938) (Disbarment is fitting
only where there is corrupt conduct); also Ex parte Bradley, 7
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Wall. 364 (1868) and Bradley v. Fisher, 313 Wall. 335 (1871) a
related case.
In contrast with the principal case, consider the case of In re
Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953)- proceedings arising from the same
trial (United States v. Dennis et al, supra) as the Sacher case. In
that case, permanent disbarment was approved by a divided court.
Isserman had previously been suspended for a short time as the
result of a conviction on a statutory rape charge. That was 1924.
For his conduct in the Dennis trial he had been disbarred in New
Jersey. Since the federal courts usually follow the state courts as
to eligibility to practice law, Isserman was called to show cause
why he should not be disbarred. Four of the justices held that
Isserman had not shown cause, and that the decision of permanent
disbarment below should be upheld. Four held that they couldn't
recall a case where an attorney was disbarred solely for contempt
of court, yet they did recall several cases where attorneys were
convicted of serious contempts, of this same nature, without their
standing at the bar being brought in question. The William M.
Tweed trial was cited as an example. Tweed v. Davis, 1 Hun. 252
(N.Y. 1874). The attorneys there were David Dudley Field, later
president of the American Bar Association, and Elihu Root. As
the Supreme Court was split four and four, Justice Clark not par-
ticipating, the decision of the lower court was allowed to stand.
On October 14, 1954, more than a year after the decision in
the Isserman case, and after the Sacher case had been decided,
the Supreme Court, on rehearing in a per curiam decision held
that Isserman should be reinstated on the basis of a Supreme Court
rule, passed after the decision in that case, that disbarment of an
attorney must be approved by a majority of the court. Rule 8-
REv sED RuLEs OF THE SUPEME COURT OF THE U.S. - Effective
July 1, 1954. This was a 4 to 3 decision, 2 justices not participating.
In re Disbarment of Isserman, 23 Law Week 3091 (1954).
In the principal case the burden was on the Bar Association to
show grounds for disbarment, since, unlike Isserman, Sacher had
not been previously disciplined in a state proceeding. Sacher was
not being called upon to show cause. Further, he had no previous
blemish on his record, and the court was well aware of his fine
work in the past.
The courts in all stages of this case emphasized that they will
support attorneys who defend unpopular causes and clients. And
surely the disbarment proceedings in this case can be said to rest
on the distinction between the defense of an unpopular client, and
the manner of conducting such defense. Knowing, however, the
public's identification of an attorney with his client, and their
somewhat less than judicial temperament, this case serves as a
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warning to the Bar to keep an alert eye to see that persecution
of attorneys saddled with unpopular clients does not occur. The
minutes of Bar proceedings are replete with resolutions respecting
the traditional duty of members of the bar to defend the most in-
defensible. REPORTS OF AmER CAN BAR ASSoCiATmON (1953) VoL 78,
p. 304; NEW YORK STATE BAR BULLETn, July 1952, p. 219. But it
is still true that actions speak louder than words, and positive
steps should be taken to emphasize to the layman the Bar's support
both of these attorneys, and of the ethical principle of counsel for
the most heinous and detested of defendants.
John Yeatman Taggart
NEGOTuIBLE INsTRUMENTS - CoGNovrr NOTES - JOiNT AND
SEVERAL JUDGMENTS
In 1929, the plaintiff and her husband signed a one year cog-
novit note payable to the defendant. The note read in part "***
Andy and Elizabeth Kender promise to pay *** and (blank) here-
by authorize any Attorney at Law to appear in any Court of Rec-
ord in the State of Ohio, or in any other state in the United States
after the above obligation becomes due, and waive the issuing
and service of process and confess a judgment against (blank) in
favor of the holder hereof ***." The makers defaulted on the note,
and in 1945 a judgment by confession was rendered against the
plaintiff, Elizabeth Kender, for the amount of the note plus interest.
In the present action the plaintiff asked the Common Pleas Court
of Montgomery County to vacate the judgment and permanently
restrain the enforcenent of the cognovit clause in the note since
plaintiff's husband who had died prior to the first suit was not
a party to the confession of the judgment and, therefore, not joined
as a defendant. Held, for the plaintiff. The court indicated that the
language of the instrument grants authority to confess a joint
judgment against the parties signing a cognovit note, but under
the rule of strict interpretation applicable to cognovit notes the
implication will not be extended so as to authorize confession of
a several judgment against either of the parties. Kender v. Farkas,
66 Ohio L. Abs. 54, 99 N.E. 2d 334 (1951).
The general rule has been stated to be that the warrant of an
attorney to confess judgment is revoked by the death of one of the
joint obligors. 23 0. JuR. 742; See Note, 44 A.L.R. 1310. This general
rule has been adopted by Ohio. Hoffmaster v. G. M. McKeivey Co.,
88 Ohio St. 552, 106 N.E. 1061 (1913); Saulpaugh v. Born, 22 Ohio
App. 275, 154 N.E. 166 (1925); Haggard v. Shick, 151 Ohio St. 535,
86 N.E. 2d 785 (1949).
The major problem that the court encountered was deciding
whether the words "Andy and Elizabeth Kender" impart a joint
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or a several obligation. Even prior to the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law courts accepted certain statements as imposing
both joint and several liability. For example, the words "I promise
to pay" in an instrument signed by two or more persons, consti-
tute a joint and several promise. Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio St. 163
(1871); First National Bank v. Fowler, 36 Ohio St. 524 (1881).
The N.I.L. adopted this interpretation. Omo REV. CODE § 1301.19 G
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 17-7). There is also a
general rule of law which defines joint liability. Section 112 of The
Restatements of Contracts sets down the general rule [qualified
only by section 115, in essence, Ohio Rev. Code § 1301.19 G (see
above), and section 116 concerning joint endorsers] that "where
two or more parties to a contract promise the same performance
to the same promisee, they incur only a joint duty unless the con-
trary is stated, or unless the terms of the promise or the extrinsic
circumstances indicate an intention on their part to be bound
severally, or jointly and severally ...." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 112 (1932).
The power of an attorney to confess a judgment is peculiarly
limited by Ohio law. In Haggard v. Shick, supra, the Ohio Supreme
Court said, "A warrant of attorney authorizing the confession of
only a joint judgment against the makers of a note does not au-
thorize confession of any judgment after the death of one of the
makers." The court in that case was using the rule stated in Spence
v. Emerine, 46 Ohio St. 439, 21 N.E. 866 (1889), that "... authority
given by warrant of attorney to confess a judgment against the
maker of the note, must be clear and explicit, and strictly pur-
sued, and we cannot supply any supposed omissions of the parties."
In short, the court reaffirmed the Ohio rule that the power of at-
torney to confess judgment must be strictly construed. Cushman
v. Welch, 19 Ohio St. 536 (1869); Shuck v. McDonald, 58 Ohio
App. 398, 16 N.E. 2d 621 (1938); Cartmell v. First National Bank
and Trust Co., 10 Ohio L. Abs. 689 (1930).
It is a general rule in Ohio and in other states that a note
signed by two makers and reading "we promise to pay" is a joint
note only. See Avery v. Vansickle, 35 Ohio St. 270 (1879); McCoy
v. Jones, 61 Ohio St. 119, 55 N.E. 219 (1894). Even a note with
the words reading "the undersigned promise to pay" has been held
to be a joint obligation only. Miller v. Dime Savings Bank Co., 18
Ohio L. Abs. 627 (1935).
The court in the principal case, therefore, came to the con-
clusion that the words "Andy and Elizabeth Kender" were to be
construed as if the pronoun "we" were present and it accordingly
held that the authority to confess judgment was joint only.
The principal case illustrates the effect of the rule of strict
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interpretation in the field of cognovit notes. Because of this rule
it seems that every ambiguous cognovit note in Ohio that is signed
by two or more persons must be construed to confer only authority
to confess a joint judgment, and the death of one of the co-makers
will deprive a plaintiff of the cognovit remedy. However the plain-
tiff may still be able to join the remaining obligor and the de-
ceased maker's estate to obtain a judgment since the right to re-
cover the loaned money is not barred unless the statute of limita-
tions has run.
Howard Webster Bernstein
STATE TAXATION - GIFs IN CoxTEmPLATIoN
OF DEATH- BuRDEN OF PROOF
Decedent had transferred her farm to the taxpayer, her son,
within two years prior to her death without receiving valuable
consideration. In the determination of the succession tax by the
probate court, the property was included in the decedents estate.
On appeal, held, affirmed. The person claiming that the transfer
was not made in contemplation of death has the burden to so prove
by a preponderance of the evidence, and that burden was not met.
In re Estate of Walker, 161 Ohio St. 564, 120 N.E. 2d 432 (1954).
The primary problem for the supreme court's determination
was the construction that should be given the following Ohio
statute:
Any transfer of property from a resident or of property
within this state from a non-resident, if shown to have
been made without a valuable consideration substantially
equivalent in money or money's worth to the full value of
such property, if so made within two years' prior to the
death of the transferor, shall, unless shown to the contrary,
be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death
within the meaning of this title .... OrIo REV. CODE
§ 5731.04. (Italics added).
In cases involving this and similarly worded statutes the ma-
jority of the courts have stated that the burden was cast upon the
donees to show that gifts within this period were not made in
contemplation of death. Tax Commission of Ohio v. Parker, 117
Ohio St. 215, 158 N.E. 89 (1927); Estate of Meyers, 26 Ohio N.P.
57 (1926); Estate of Hildebrandt, 86 Ohio App. 246 (1949); Wick-
wire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 (1927); Estate of Buck, 176 N.Y.
Misc. 848 (1941); Mann's Estate, 219 Iowa 597, 258 N.W. 904 (1935);
38 0. Jut. TAXATIoN § 432. But these same cases do not indicate
the quantum or degree of evidence which must be presented by
the taxpayer, the instant case seeming to be the only Ohio Supreme
Court case which determines this problem.
Now, if the statute in question be considered as creating a
presumption that the gift was made in contemplation of death, it
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would seem that the one against whom the presumption arises
would need only to produce just enough evidence to counterbal-
ance that presumption. In construing a statute which created a
rebuttable presumption of negligence, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Kiunk v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 74 Ohio St. 125 77 N.E. 752
(1906), stated that, "The general rule would seem to be well
esablished by an almost unbroken line of authority, that to rebut
and destroy a mere prima facie case, the party upon whom rests
the burden of repelling its effect, need only to produce such amount
or degree of proof as will countervail the presumption arising
therefrom.., it need not overbalance or outweigh it." See also
Brunny v. Prudential Insurance Co., 151 Ohio St. 86, 84 N.E. 2d
504 (1949); Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336
(1928); 17 0. JuR. EVIDENCE § 115; 17 0. JuR. EVIDENCE § 73; TRACY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 30 ( .... ); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2491 (3rd ed. 1940). Also, more specifically with respect to taxa-
tion, Corpus Juris Secundum states, "The state has the burden of
proving that the transfer has been made in contemplation of death,
but, where it establishes that the transfer falls within the terms of
a statute creating a presumption that it has been made in contem-
plation of death, the burden is then on the taxpayer to go forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption." 85 C.J.S. TAxATIoN § 1147
(2) C (1954). This last quotation is congruent with the general
rule that presumptions do not change or shift the burden of proof;
rather, their effect is only to change the duty of going forward
with the evidence after the party having the burden in the sense
of the risk of non-persuasion has made out a prima facie case.
Kunk v. Railway, supra; Brunny v. Insurance Co., supra; Shep-
ard v. Insurance Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E. 2d 156 (1949); 17 0.
JuR. EVIDENCE § 115; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § (3rd ed. 1940).
This being so, then who has the burden of proof in succession
tax cases? As the supreme court stated in the instant case, it is
fundamental law that the burden generally is upon the taxing au-
thority to show that any particular property or transfer comes
within a tax statute. Clearly, in the case of gifts made more than
two years before the transferor's death, the burden of proving that
the gifts were made in contemplation of death is upon the taxing
authority. Estate of Robinson, 145 Ohio St. 55, 60 N.E. 2d 615 (1945).
Also, the court has stated that the statute is one creating a rebut-
table presumption. Estate of Robinson, supra; Estate of Thompson,
147 Ohio St. 119, 68 N.E. 2d 71 (1946).
Thus we find that the burden herein was originally upon the
state; that the gift being made within two years of death and
without a valuable consideration, the State was aided by a rebut-
table presumption; that this ordinarily transfers only the duty of
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going forward to present some evidence in rebuttal.
The supreme court in the instant case reached a different
conclusion. In examining the wording of the statute, the court
found that "unless shown to the contrary" means "to show"; to
"make clear by evidence"; thus, to prove by a prepondarence.
These words did not appear in the statute involved in Kunk v.
Railway, supra, in which the statute was held to have created a
rebuttable presumption. The court in the instant case stated, "If,
then, the statute involved in the present case read simply that if
a transfer is made within two years prior to the death of a trans-
feror and without sufficient consideration it shall be deemed to
have been made in contemplation of death, a different question
would be presented." The inference of this decision is that the
statute involved effects more than a mere presumption; it shifts
the burden of proof to the taxpayer.
New Jersey has a statute similar to Ohio's which reads, "...
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have
been made in contemplation of death...." N.J.S.A. 54:34-1. In con-
sidering a case in which the transfer had been made more than
two years prior to death, the New Jersey Equity Court stated,
"Where the gift is made less than two years prior to the donor's
death, the statutory presumption... arises upon proof by the state
that the transfer was a gift and was of a material part of the donor's
estate, and this casts upon the taxpayer the duty of going forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption; but of course in every
case, the burden of proof is upon the state, on the whole case."
Cairns v. Martin, 130 N.J. Eq. 313, 22 A. 2d 415 (1941).
It is appreciated that were the court to have held otherwise
in the instant case a heavy burden would have been placed upon
the state in proving in all such cases, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the gift had been made in contemplation of death;
the taxpayer confessedly being in a better position to establish the
donor's motive in making the gift. In so holding, the court has
removed what might otherwise be an unreasonable burden in an
important and essential area of state authority.
Richard C. Pickett
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